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Abstract
This paper uses the data of 1338 rural households in the Northern Mountainous Region of Vietnam to examine the
extent to which subsidised credit targets the poor and its impacts. Principal Component Analysis and Propensity Score
Matching were used to evaluate the depth of outreach and the income impact of credit. To address the problem of
model uncertainty, the approach of Bayesian Model Average applied to the probit model was used.
Results showed that subsidised credit successfully targeted the poor households with 24.10 % and 69.20% of clients
falling into the poorest group and the three bottom groups respectively. Moreover, those who received subsidised credit
make up 83 % of ethnic minority households. These results indicate that governmental subsidies are necessary to reach
the poor and low income households, who need capital but are normally bypassed by commercial banks.
Analyses also showed that ethnicity and age of household heads, number of helpers, savings, as well as how affected
households are by shocks were all factors that further explained the probability at which subsidised credit has been
assessed. Furthermore, recipients obtained a 2.61 % higher total income and a 5.93 % higher farm income compared
to non-recipients. However, these small magnitudes of effects are statistically insignificant at a 5 % level. Although
the subsidised credit is insufficient to significantly improve the income of the poor households, it possibly prevents
these households of becoming even poorer.
Keywords: credit outreach, poverty reduction, subsidised credit, Northern Vietnam
1 Introduction
Poverty reduction is considered to be the main ob-
jective of anti-poverty programs including those target-
ing rural credit (Guirkinger & Boucher, 2008). Lack of
access to credit is regarded as one of the most crucial
reasons explaining why the poor rural households in de-
veloping countries remain poor (Collins et al., 2009).
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However, providing credit to rural people, rural lenders
have to deal with some risky issues such as rural sea-
sonality, adverse selection, and higher transaction costs
(Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). Consequently, these
issues create a trade-off between financial sustainability
and depth of outreach (Cull et al., 2011). Poverty tar-
geting cannot be achieved by means of providing credit
due to the pressure of financial sustainability by lenders
(Hermes & Lensink, 2011). Focusing on sustainability
can either ignore the provision of credit to the poorest
households or eliminate the social goals of credit insti-
tutions. For this reason, subsidies might be necessary if
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credit institutions target the extremely poor but face the
problem of financial sustainability.
In Vietnam, about 70 % of the total population lives
in rural areas and 53.9 % of total national labour force
works in the agricultural sector, which contributes
nearly 22 % percent of total national domestic product.
Moreover, nearly 94 % of the poor in Vietnam live in
these rural areas. Most low-income households are rural
households, which account for 44.8 % of total national
households (General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 2012).
Vietnam has achieved significant success in poverty
reduction in the last two decades. Poverty headcount
rate reduced from nearly 60 % of the population in 1993
to 11.7 % in 2011. However, disparities in poverty re-
duction are still emerging. Poverty intensity is substan-
tially higher in the Northern Mountainous Region. Al-
though making up 28.79 % of natural area and 12.83 %
of total population, the poverty rate is 60.1 % in the
Northwest and 37.7 % in the Northeast of the country
(Badiani et al., 2012). Agricultural production serves
as the main source of income for a high proportion of
rural residents. Rice, maize and cassava are common
crops and a variety of pigs, cows, buffaloes, chickens
and ducks are kept as the main species of livestock.
The poor and ethnic minorities in the Northern upland
region reported an especially high demand for credit.
According to World Bank (2009), 81 % of the ethnic
minorities see the capital shortage as a major constraint
to investment in farming activities. In the region, poor
households mainly borrow from the Vietnam Bank for
Social Policy (VBSP) which was established in 2002 to
provide the poor and ethnic minorities with subsidised
credit. In 2011, VBSP, with the support of the United
Nation Development Program (UNDP) and Vietnamese
Committee for Ethnic Minorities (CEM), embarked on
an expansion project set to be complete in 2020. The
overall goal of this project is to reduce poverty through
the expansion of the subsidised credit program. Specif-
ically, the VBSP aims to achieve its goal of becoming a
successful and sustainable Vietnamese microfinance in-
stitution by 2020. It is in this context that the poverty
targeting and the role of subsidised credit in poverty
reduction should be examined to provide information
necessary on credit expansion and its relative success
in alleviating poverty. This paper aims to answer two
main research questions: (1) Does subsidised credit tar-
get poor households as a contribution to national rural
development and poverty reduction? (2) Is the provi-
sion of subsidised credit an effective tool in improving
household income?
2 Materials and methods
2.1 Data
Data used in this study are collected from the 2012
round of the Vietnam Access to Resources House-
hold Survey (VARHS), which considered 3700 surveyed
households in 12 provinces of the country. The VARHS
2012 survey covered a variety of topics relating to
household endowments and access to resources. The
survey was jointly conducted by the Institute for Pol-
icy and Strategy for Rural Development (ISPARD), the
Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM),
and the Institute for Labour Science and Social Affairs
(ILSSA) under the technical support from the Depart-
ment of Economics at the University of Copenhagen.
The survey was financed by the organisation of the Dan-
ish International Development Assistance (DANIDA).
For the current work, data of 1338 households were ex-
tracted from four provinces, namely Lai Cai, Phu Tho,
Lai Chau & Dien Bien in the Northern Mountainous Re-
gion of Vietnam. The existing data represent a practical,
valid and useful source of information for this study.
2.2 Methods
2.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
Meyer et al. (2000) defined the depth of poverty of
clients targeted as how far down in the income distri-
bution credit institutions can reach. This study focused
on using a relative poverty index to evaluate the depth
of outreach because it reflects the multi-dimensions of
poverty and is less dependent on inflation rates over
time (Zeller et al., 2006). In order to compute a rela-
tive poverty index for each individual household, Princi-
pal Component Analysis (PCA) is used. PCA provides
plausible and defensible weights for an index or assets to
serve as a proxy for poverty. The main idea of PCA is to
reduce the dimensionality of the dataset and define how
the different indicators can be well combined to com-
pute a relative poverty status of a particular household.
Córdova (2009) suggests the use of the first Principal
Component, which accounts for a highest eigenvalue of
the correlation matrix of asset indicators. In this study,
PCA is employed to extract a linear combination to best
describe the indicators in a household dataset and trans-
form them into one single index. The relative poverty
index is measured as follows:
Relative poverty score j = (1)
w1H1 + w2H2 + w3H3 + · · · + wnHn
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Where:
w1, w2, w3. . . wn are the weights specified such that the
poverty score index accounts for the maximum vari-
ances in H1,H2, . . . Hn.
Because the original variables have very different





In Formula 2, hn is the value of the variable for each
particular household, and µn and sn are the mean and
standard deviation of the variable for the whole dataset.
A household with a lower relative poverty score is rel-
atively poorer than one with a higher score. After
computing the relative poverty score for each individ-
ual household, non-recipients are classified into 5 equal
groups. The top fifth is called the “richest” group and
the last fifth is called the “poorest” group; therefore,
each quintile accounts for 20 % of total households. The
cut-off scores for each quintile determine the border
or the limits between poverty groups. Based on those
scores, households with access to subsidised credit are
then assigned into the five corresponding groups to com-
pute the share of each accessed household group in total
recipients. The differences in percentages of each rel-
ative poverty group between households with access to
subsidised credit and those without imply the depth of
outreach.
2.2.2 Propensity Score Matching (PSM)
2.2.2.1 Main ideas of Propensity Score Matching
The key assumption of PSM is that clients and non-
clients with similar characteristics should also have the
same outcomes except for accessing subsidised credit.
The comparison between household groups with similar
characteristics yields less biased estimation results com-
pared to Ordinary Least Square estimation (Huber et al.,
2013). Also, the estimators by PSM are less sensitive
to functional forms compared to regressions (Blundell
& Dias, 2009). This approach is much more flexible
for estimating the welfare impact of credit on multiple
outcome variables of interest (Imbens & Rubin, 2015).
PSM is an especially useful approach to address the
selection bias, which occurs due to unobservable vari-
ables, which do not figure into the credit access model
but still influence the household outcome (Caliendo &
Kopeinig, 2008).
2.2.2.2 Selection of covariates
The first step in PSM is to explore factors explaining
the difference in credit accessibility between households
with access to subsidised credit and those without. A
household might decide to apply for subsidised credit
based on its projected benefits as well as costs. If the
net benefit is positive, then the household might choose
to borrow and vice versa. The net benefit can be denoted
by LVi, which is a latent variable reflecting the net bene-
fit of using credit. LVi is assumed to associate with a set
of explanatory variables Hi, which refers to household
endowments, Hi = (H1i,H2i, . . . ,Hki). Mathematically,
the relationship can be written as follows:
LVi = Hiβi + εi, εi ∼ N(0, σ2i ),∀i = 1, 2, . . .M (3)
Of which, εi is an error term following the normal distri-
bution and M is the number of households. However, in
reality, LVi is not observable. Only an indicator variable
for taking subsidised credit is observable and defined as:
TLi =
{




TLi denotes the credit status of the household. TLi
equals one if the household took subsidised credit in the
previous 24 months and otherwise zero. Suppose that
credit access status is explained by household endow-
ments in terms of different capital.
TLi = f (social capital, physical capital,
human capital, financial capital)
(5)
Because TLi is a binary dependent variable, the probit
model is more appropriate in estimating the conditional
probabilities of accessing credit based on household en-
dowments (Bun, 2002). The key question related to the
specification of the probit model, however, lies in the
selection of suitable explanatory variables. This is also
the most important statistical problem today in regres-
sion models (Breiman, 2001). This model uncertainty
leads to unreliability in the magnitude of coefficients,
standard errors and misleading interpretation of results.
To address the aforementioned problems, this study
is based on the approach of Bayesian Model Average
(BMA). This approach has a number of attractive fea-
tures in addressing the uncertainty of model selection
and make the inferences less risky than previous ap-
proaches (Hoeting et al., 1999). The main advantage
of BMA is that it relies on the support of a posterior
probability to select an appropriate set of explanatory
variables (Blattenberger et al., 2013). In BMA analy-
sis, the Bayesian Information Criterion approximation
(BIC) is frequently used as criteria for selecting appro-
priate models. BMA chooses a model which the lowest
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BIC value. By using Gibbs sampling to simulate data of
latent variables, BIC can be applied directly to the probit
regression. According to Albert & Chib (1993), the pur-
pose of Gibbs sampling is to calculate posterior distribu-
tion of parameters, approximate the value of latent vari-
able and incorporate those variables into the model to
achieve better parameters. BMA averages many model
specifications, especially ones with high posterior prob-
abilities to address the problem of model uncertainty re-
lated to estimated parameters.
2.2.2.3 Income impact estimation
The second step of PSM is to compare the differences
in means of welfare variables between recipients and
non-recipients, who have similar characteristics except
for credit access. The welfare impact is denoted by the
Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT ) and
expressed formally as:
ATT = E(∆
∣∣∣D=1) = E(Y1∣∣∣D=1) − E(Y0∣∣∣D=0) (6)
Where:
E(Y1
∣∣∣D=1) represents outcomes for recipients.
E(Y0
∣∣∣D=0) represents the welfare for matched non-
recipients.
The equation (6) allows extraction of the effect of
credit on the households from the total effects estimated.
In empirical estimation, each treated observation i is
matched j control observations and their outcome y 0 are









w(i, j) Y0, j
 (7)
Where: n1 is the number of recipients; Y1,i is the out-
come for the recipient i; Y0, j is the outcome for the
matched non-recipient j; and w(i, j) are weights.
Propensity Score Matching with bootstrapping is ap-
propriate to make the estimations less sensitive to gener-
ally infer the larger target population (Austin & Small,
2014). For this reason, this study is further interested
in constructing the distribution for the ATT estimator.
A bootstrap sample is a sample drawn using replace-
ments from the original sample, such that the size of the
bootstrap sample is equal to that of the original sam-
ple (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993). In this approach, the
bootstrap in this present study is applied to the matched
households.
One key issue in executing PSM is the choice of
matching algorithm because there have been several
types of matching. The Nearest Neighbour Matching is
an algorithm in which the individual recipient is selected
as a matching partner for a non-recipient that is clos-
est in terms of propensity score. The matching replace-
ment is employed because the average quality of match-
ing will increase and the bias will decrease (Imbens &
Rubin, 2015). The second approach is radius matching,
in which each recipient is matched with a non-recipient
that falls within a specified radius. The third approach,
the Kernel matching, of which each recipient is matched
with several non-recipients, with weights inversely pro-
portion to the distance between accessed households and
non-accessed ones (Imai et al., 2010). And finally, the
idea of stratification matching is to compare the out-
comes within intervals or blocks of propensity scores.
Their joint consideration of these four methods offers a
way to assess the robustness of the estimates (Becker &
Ichino, 2002).
3 Results
3.1 Subsidised credit and characteristics
The subsidised credit of the VBSP is the major form
of government intervention on rural credit markets in
Vietnam. Borrowers pay only part of the commercial in-
terest rate, and the remainder is paid by the government.
Among the 1338 households in the sample, 259 received
subsidised credit, making up 19.36 %. Accessed house-
holds received a credit amount from 2 to 30 million
VND with an average of 19 million VND per household.
Subsidised credit has the average duration of nearly 48
months. The VBSP charges much lower interest rates
(0.72 % per month) when compared to a market rate of
1.36 % per month by the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture
and Rural Development.
Proper utilisation of the subsidised credit in the ap-
propriate fields can yield high benefits for farmers. Most
borrowers primarily use subsidised credit for financing
farming activities, making up 40.15 % of total recipi-
ents. Poor households also use credit for other purposes,
including asset purchase (20.08%), food consumption
(5.79 %), education (12.36%), nonfarm (2.32 %) and
other purposes (19.30%). In general, the structure of
credit use is appropriate to lending policies, which fo-
cus on farming activities.
3.2 Poverty targeting of subsidised credit
3.2.1 Selection of variables for Principal Component
Analysis
In this study, income per capita is considered the
benchmark poverty indicator because it represents a
comprehensive measure of welfare at the household
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level in many cultures (Zeller et al., 2006). Other vari-
ables in the household survey are selected partly based
on the suggestions by Chen & Schreiner (2009) for a
simple poverty scorecard for Vietnam. The variables
contributing to the poverty score index in this study
are also selected based on statistical analysis. Accord-
ingly, the criteria for variable selection are based on the
strength and significance of the correlation of each vari-
able with the poverty benchmark indicator. Only those
statistically correlated with the significance level of less
than 1 % with the benchmark indicator are used in the
Principal Component Analysis. Correlation of a binary
variable with the benchmark indicator is calculated by
the approach of Point-Biserial Correlation (Kornbrot,
2005).
3.2.2 Results of Principal Component Analysis
As discussed, only the first component, which has an
eigenvalue greater than one and accounts for larger vari-
ance, is selected. Table 1 reveals the results of Prin-
cipal Component Analysis. The table also reveals that
all variables have a strong correlation with income per
capita. Component loading coefficients represent the
correlation between the variable and the first compo-
nent. Most variables load quite strongly to the first com-
ponent, as indicated by the absolute value of loadings.
Only the first component has the best and strongest in-
terrelationship with all different items, so it is the most
appropriate component. When the value of a variable
increases, with the exception of the variable family size,
the household tends to be relatively wealthier.
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test is an index for
comparing the magnitudes of observed correlation co-
efficients with the magnitudes of partial correlation co-
efficients. In this analysis, KMO equals 0.86, which is
much greater than 0.60, indicating the adequacy of the
sampling.
Table 1: Results of Principal Component Analysis






Income per capita (1000 VND) 12295.17 14401.62 1∗∗∗ 0.34
Age of household heads (years) 47.70 13.79 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14
Family size (persons) 4.94 2.06 –0.34∗∗∗ –0.25
Square meters occupied by the household, including bedrooms,
dining rooms, living rooms (m2)
67.93 43.70 0.22∗∗∗ 0.17
Main construction material of the outside walls (1=cement,
brick or marble/tile; 0= otherwise)
0.31 0.46 0.42∗∗∗ 0.41
Flooring material (1=cement, brick or marble/tile; 0=otherwise) 0.45 0.50 0.38∗∗∗ 0.37
Roof material (1= concrete/cement or tile; 0= otherwise) 0.32 0.47 0.30∗∗∗ 0.32
Households have electricity (1=Yes; 0=otherwise) 0.94 0.24 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13
Main source of energy for cooking in the household
(1= Gas and electricity; 0= firewood or coal, etc.)
0.17 0.37 0.49∗∗∗ 0.36
Main source of cooking/drinking water in the household
(1=Private tap water inside/outside the house, or purchased
water in tank or bottle ; 0=otherwise)
0.05 0.23 0.25∗∗∗ 0.22
Type of toilet arrangement (1= flush toilet with specific tank
and sewage pipes; 0= otherwise)
0.45 0.50 0.40∗∗∗ 0.36
Total asset (1000 VND) 14195.96 28859.23 0.43∗∗∗ 0.18
Model specification
Eigen value 4.01
Variance explained (%) 33.43
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) 0.86
Number of observations 1338
∗∗∗ significant at 1 % level, Note: sum of squares (Colum-loading) = 1
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3.2.3 Poverty outreach of subsidised credit
This section relies on the relative poverty index cal-
culated for each household to evaluate the poverty out-
reach of subsidised credit. Table 2 presents the poverty
outreach of subsidised credit across relative poverty
household groups. The table shows that the bottom three
accessed household groups, especially the poorest, are
overrepresented by subsidised credit when compared to
non-clients. The shares of those households in total ac-
cessed households are greater than 20 %. The poverty
target in the case of the VBSP is very consistent with
its explicit mission to provide credit to the poor and low
income households.
3.3 Income impact of subsidised credit on accessed
households
3.3.1 Description of selected variables in explaining
credit accessibility
It is assumed that credit access is not random, but
rather conditional in accordance with household charac-
teristics. There can be various household endowments
influencing credit accessibility of poor households. In
this study, the choice of relevant variables is based on
literature review and potential significance for policy in-
terventions (see Table 3 for further details).
HELP: Help is one important dimension of so-
cial capital. A better connection with helpers facil-
itates household social capital, which is necessary to
overcome difficulties, access information, and improve
the household economic situation (Story & Carpiano,
2015). Dufhues et al. (2011) indicate that greater social
capital can improve the abilities of borrowers to repay
these loans.
RELA: Behr et al. (2011) revealed that households
with better relationships to local authorities might have
better access to governmental credit programs. The co-
efficient sign of this variable is expected to be positive.
EXTE: Buadi et al. (2013) showed that households
can manage and use resources effectively through ac-
cess to agricultural extension services such as informa-
tion support, input supply, and training. In addition,
by maintaining relationships with agricultural extension
stations, households can improve their social capital.
It has conclusively been shown that social capital is
very important in providing information on credit pro-
grams to potential borrowers and in reducing the cost of
searching (Okten & Osili, 2004).
DIST: The distance of the household to the commune
centre is used to capture household access to informa-
tion as well as the costs of travelling to banks. A greater
distance might hinder household social communication
and increase transaction costs, which are expected to de-
crease the probability of credit access and repayment
(Khoi et al., 2013).
AGE: According to de Sherbinin et al. (2008), age
of households can represent farming experience, which
is relevant to productivity and efficiency of farming pro-
duction. A younger household head could be more eager
to adopt new technologies and therefore could have bet-
ter credit access. Age also influences the household eco-
nomic decision making regarding household consump-
tion and production. In this sense, an older household
head could have a better social reputation and a more
cautious attitude about debt, which can also enhance
credit repayment and credit access. There is an ambigu-
ous relationship between age of household heads and
credit access.
MINO: This variable captures the endowment differ-
ences between the ethnic minorities and the Kinh ma-
jority population in Vietnam. Ethnic minorities are ex-
pected to have better access to subsidised credit.
HSIZE: It has been suggested that a larger household
with a greater number of labourers can have the poten-
tial to adopt farming technologies and generate greater
profits (Nuryartono et al., 2005). In addition, Yuan &
Xu (2015) investigated that family size is principal de-
termining factor of connecting social network and ac-
cessing informal credit. However, a larger household
has more economic dependants, increasing the likeli-
hood of using credit for consumption purposes. The sign
of this variable is therefore ambiguous.
Table 2: Depth of outreach by subsidised credit
Depth of outreach
Relative poverty groups classified by the relative poverty index (%)
Total
Poorest Less poor Medium Better off Richest
Without access to subsidised credit
(n = 1079)
20 20 20 20 20 100
Access to subsidised credit
(n = 259)
24.10 23.70 21.40 19.50 11.30 100
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Table 3: Description of explanatory variables and expected signs with respect to subsidised credit accessibility
Variables Type Definition Expected signs
HELP Continuous The number of people known who could be asked for help (persons) +
RELA Binary Households have members, relatives or friends holding office or
other trusted position in the communes (1=Yes).
+
EXTE Continuous Number of contacts with agricultural extension in the last 12 months
(number)
+
DIST Continuous The distance of the household to the commune centre (km) –
AGE Continuous Age of household heads (years) +/–
MINO Binary Ethnicity of household heads (1= ethnic minorities) +
HSIZE Continuous Total members of the household (persons) +/–
EDUA Continuous General education of household heads (years in school) +
NFAM Continuous Share of nonfarm-nonwage income in total household income (%) +
SAVE Continuous Total value of savings (VND 1000) +/–
SHOC Binary Households experience any types of shocks (1= Yes) –
LOSS Continuous Economic losses due to shocks (VND 1000) –
ASET Continuous Total value of household asset (VND 1000) +
PLOT Continuous The number of land plots household own (number) +/–
EDUA: A number of authors have considered the ef-
fects of education of household heads on credit access.
According to Foltz (2004), a household head with a
higher level of education is believed to be a better man-
ager regarding farm household decisions, performing
better risk management and higher income generation.
Moreover, education level also represents the potential
to access information and to work in off-farm activities.
From the point of view of lenders, more educated house-
holds are more creditworthy than less educated ones. In
a study conducted by Brehanu & Fufa (2008), it was
shown that education and training experiences of bor-
rowers are positively correlated with farmer profits and
abilities to repay.
NFAM: Stampini & Davis (2009) concluded that
households engaging in off-farm labour activities spend
significantly more on seeds, services, hired labour, and
livestock inputs. Nonfarm income is therefore consid-
ered support for financing farming activities. House-
holds with higher nonfarm income are more likely to ac-
cess technologies and are less vulnerable to risks (Sim-
towe et al., 2006).
SAVE: On the one hand, sufficient savings can serve
as an insurance tool and a financial substitution source
for credit. As a result, households with enough capital
from savings or income, demand less credit (Dong et al.,
2012). On the other hand, households with insufficient
savings to finance agricultural production can also apply
loans to fulfil their capital shortage. The coefficient of
this variable is expected to have an ambiguous sign.
SHOC and LOSS: Shocks regarding bad weather con-
ditions can reduce farming productivity (Zeller et al.,
2000). The poor are also vulnerable to shocks from ill-
ness and death in the household as well as fluctuations
in commodity prices. Consequently, lending to the agri-
cultural sector and the poor is considered to be so risky
that lenders are reluctant to grant loans to these groups.
Moreover, economic losses due to shocks reduce house-
hold income and can often push rural households further
into poverty.
ASET: This variable reflects the total value of house-
hold furniture, television, radios, vehicles and other
moveable assets. An asset is believed to represent the
relative wealth level of households, which determines
their credit accessibility (Takahashi et al., 2010).
PLOT: This variable indicates the number of land
plots a household owns. A great number of plots
with small sizes might indicate internal land fragmen-
tation, which is believed to discourage mechanisation
and intensive investment in farming activities (Van Dijk,
2003). A study by Manjunatha et al. (2013) con-
cluded that land fragmentation is the main determinant
of inefficiency of irrigated farms. As a consequence
of land fragmentation, agricultural productivity and in-
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come cannot be improved. However, in a developing
country like Vietnam, more land plots might also rep-
resent the wealth level of households, which could en-
hance their credit access. There is an ambiguous coeffi-
cient sign for this variable.
3.3.2 Endowment differences between households
with access to subsidised credit and those with-
out
The explanatory factors for the differences in access-
ing subsidised credit might include variations of house-
hold resources. For this reason, it is interesting to look
first at the difference in selected explanatory variables
between recipients and non-recipients.
Results in Table 4 indicate that the number of con-
tacts with extension services, distance to the commune
centre, and educational level of household heads are
insignificantly different between recipients and non-
recipients. Credit receiving households seem to know
more people whom they can call upon for help and
also tend to have better connections with local author-
ities through relatives, friends. Also family size is sub-
stantially higher for these households. Subsidised credit
tends to serve households with younger heads and ethnic
minority households. Households accessing subsidised
credit tend to be more affected by shocks. Recipients of
subsidised credit have a lower share of nonfarm income
because most of those clients engage in farming produc-
tion. In addition, borrowers of subsidised credit have a
significantly lower value of savings and assets but own
a higher number of land plots.
3.3.3 Determinants of accessing subsidised credit
Table 5 reports the probability of including each ex-
planatory variable, expected value, and standard devia-
tion of coefficients derived from the BMA analysis. For
example, the probability of including the age of house-
hold heads is 83.5 %. To explain the credit accessibil-
ity, 43 different models have been selected, which the
5 best models having a cumulative posterior probabil-
ity of 0.3618. A good model has a small value for
the Bayesian information criterion (Claeskens & Jansen,
2015). As a result the model with a posterior proba-
bility of 0.139 is finally selected. The rate of correct
classification in this model is estimated to be 80.49%.
These five explanatory variables are associated with
subsidised credit accessibility at a 1 % level of statistical
significance: The variable indicating number of helpers
(HELP) is positively associated with credit access. A
household with a higher level of social capital is more
likely to access subsidised credit.










HELP 3.42 (3.87) 3.31 (3.64) 3.87 (4.70) –1.79 ∗
RELA 0.28 (0.45) 0.27 (0.44) 0.33 (0.47) 3.76 ∗
EXTE 1.38 (2.22) 1.39 (2.34) 1.35 (1.64) 0.24
DIST 3.78 (5.45) 3.74 (5.62) 3.94 (4.68) –0.58
AGE 47.70 (13.79) 48.43 (13.93) 44.62 (12.73) 4.24 ∗∗∗
MINO 0.70 (0.46) 0.67 (0.47) 0.83 (0.37) 25.27 ∗∗∗
HSIZE 4.93 (2.06) 4.81 (2.09) 5.42 (1.84) -4.64 ∗∗∗
EDUA 8.96 (3.65) 8.99 (3.63) 8.83 (3.78) 0.62
NFAM 0.06 (0.18) 0.07 (0.19) 0.05 (0.15) 1.97 ∗∗
SAVE 9587.40 (34869.86) 10851.70 (37808.01) 4320.34 (17142.39) 4.16∗∗∗
SHOC 0.71 (0.45) 0.52 (0.50) 0.77 (0.42) 16.65 ∗∗∗
LOSS 4292.25 (9188.06) 4084.11 (9248.39) 5159.38 (8897.45) –1.73∗
ASET 14690.20 (28729.03) 15391.01 (31355.58) 11770.64 (12591.49) 2.93∗∗∗
PLOT 10.81 (4.15) 10.60 (4.30) 11.66 (3.33) –4.31 ∗∗∗
t-test used for continuous variables. Pearson χ2 used for discrete variables.
∗ Significant at 10 %; ∗∗ Significant at 5 %; ∗∗∗ significant at 1 %
standard deviations in parentheses
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Coefficient of the most
appropriate probit model
Intercept 100 –1.645e+00 5.054e-01 –0.9125 ∗∗∗ (–4.98)
HELP 36.6 1.601e-02 2.338e-02 0.0274 ∗∗∗ (2.84)
RELA 9.5 3.056e-02 1.055e-01 –
EXTE 0.0 0.000e+00 0.000e+00 –
DIST 0.0 0.000e+00 0.000e+00 –
AGE 83.5 –1.484e-02 8.459e-03 –0.0091 ∗∗∗ (–2.92)
MINO 77.2 5.031e-01 3.294e-01 0.3277 ∗∗∗ (3.22)
HSIZE 33.2 3.306e-02 5.191e-02 –
EDUA 0.0 0.000e+00 0.000e+00 –
NFAM 0.0 0.000e+00 0.000e+00 –
SAVE 40.4 –4.830e-06 6.994e-06 –7.66e-06 ∗∗∗ (–3.95)
SHOC 79.0 4.285e-01 2.740e-01 0.3554 ∗∗∗ (4.12)
LOSS 0.0 0.000e+00 0.000e+00 –
ASET 2.6 –1.715e-07 1.306e-06 –
PLOT 0.0 0.000e+00 0.000e+00 –
BIC –8.335e+03
Posterior probability 0.139
Number of observations 1338
LR χ2(5) 59.26
Prob > χ2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0451
Correctly classified (%) 80.49
∗∗∗ significant at 1 %. z statistics in parentheses
The variable AGE is found to have a negative coef-
ficient. Perhaps younger household heads demonstrate
active participation in local mass organisations such as
women’s unions or farmers’ unions. The younger heads
could be more active in obtaining information regard-
ing credit sources, farming technologies, and markets as
well. There are, however, other possible explanations,
which are supported by Barslund & Tarp (2008). These
authors argue that older household heads demand less
credit because they are more settled and less likely to
take on new and capital-demanding initiatives.
The variable indicating ethnicity (MINO) has a pos-
itive coefficient. If all other variables in the model are
held constant, ethnic minorities are more likely to re-
ceive subsidised credit compared to the Kinh majority.
Amount of savings (SAVE) is negatively associated
with access to subsidised credit. Holding all other in-
dependent variables constant, higher amount of savings
decreases the probability of accessing subsidised credit.
This result is likely to be related to the saving behaviour
of households, especially the poor. Savings can increase
as a result of less access to credit. Poor households need
savings as a precautionary measure to mitigate shocks
and to supplement investment as well.
The other statistically significant variable is the
household exposure to shocks (SHOC). As expected, the
coefficient of this variable is positive. Possibly, shock
affected households access subsidised credit in order to
mitigate the effects of these shocks.
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3.3.4 Income difference between two household
groups without matching
Among welfare indicators, income is widely used by
previous studies such as Wetterberg (2007), Li et al.
(2011), and Arouri et al. (2015). For this reason, this
study focuses on measuring income changes to examine
the effects of subsidised credit. Table 6 shows that, be-
fore matching, clients of subsidised credit have a signif-
icantly lower total income, and total nonfarm income.
However, farm income is higher in the case of these
clients. The explanatory factors for the income differ-
ences might include variations in the quality and quan-
tity of household resources allocated for economic ac-
tivities and different access to credit.
3.3.5 Income impact of subsidised credit after match-
ing
Heinrich et al. (2010) indicated that the inclusion of
covariates that do not influence credit access can worsen
the common support problem or unnecessarily increase
the variances of the estimates. For this reason, variables
including ethnicity and age of household heads, number
of helpers, savings and exposure to shocks selected by
the Bayesian Model Average serve as covariates in the
PSM model. The means of explanatory variables be-
fore and after matching are also tested to evaluate the
quality of matching. After matching, the differences are
no longer statistically significant. Matching helps re-
duce the mean of bias from 26.3 % to 2.1 %. PSM suc-
ceeds in balancing the characteristics between credit re-
cipients and non-recipients. In order to separate the im-
pact of subsidised credit, all recipients from other credit
sources such as the Vietnam Bank for Agricuture and
Rural Development, the People’s Credit Funds and in-
formal credit are excluded from the estimation. Using
the propensity score estimated in the probit model, re-
cipients are matched with non-recipients to estimate the
income impact of credit. In order to make these find-
ings less sensitive to the selection of different match-
ing algorithms, coefficients of the robustness check are
also reported. The matching algorithms used are nearest
neighbour, radius with a caliper of 0.001, kernel using
a Normal density and Stratification. Furthermore, stan-
dard errors estimated using bootstrap are also shown in
Table 7.
Results show that there seems to be a positive effect
of subsidised credit on total household income and to-
tal farm income, but negative impact on total nonfarm
income. The sign and statistical insignificance of those
coefficients found on total income and total farm income
are very similar using different alternatives. However,
the case of total nonfarm income is a nonrobust result
because the signs and level of the coefficient remarkably
changes in the estimation methods. The provision of
subsidised credit has led to increase total income of re-
cipients by 0.32 % to 7.19 % and increase the total farm
income by 3.46 % to 10.99 %. However, the magnitude
of those impacts is small and statistically insignificant at
a 5 % level of statistical significance.
The limited income impact could be attributed to the
fact that most poor households use subsidised credit to
finance agricultural production, which is considered to
be less profitable due to the risks. Simtowe et al. (2006)
indicate that credit is useful only for households with ac-
cess to remunerative businesses and investment opportu-
nities. Moreover, a majority of borrowers of subsidised
credit are ethnic minorities, who have more disadvan-
tages compared to the Kinh majority in terms of socio-
economic conditions (World Bank, 2009). A situation
in which poorer households benefit less from accessing
credit can also be found in Thailand, a neighbouring
country to Vietnam. Coleman (2006) emphasised the
positive impact of credit, but only for non-poor borrow-
ers. Van Rooyen et al. (2012) also showed that small
loans have higher probability of harming the poorest
households in sub-Saharan Africa and credit interven-











Total income (1000VND) 50946.87 (49862.03) 52332.54 (52487.03) 45174.12 (36493.93) 2.58 ∗∗∗
Farm income (1000VND) 20134.97 (20932.03) 19875.30 (21860.09) 21216.78 (16506.22) –1.09
Total nonfarm income (1000VND) 21474.40 (42135.37) 22595.70 (44447.43) 16803.06 (30309.68) 2.49 ∗∗
The absolute value of standard deviation in parentheses
1000 VND ≈ 0.04 Euro
Do Xuan Luan et al. / J. Agr. Rural Develop. Trop. Subtrop. 116 - 2 (2015) 173–186 183







































% change of income –1.89 14.47 –3.52 –2.04
Number of matched treatment 259 247 259 259
Number of matched control 186 520 782 782
Each column reports the matching estimator with a different matching algorithm (1) nearest neighbour matching using 1 nearest neighbour
(2) radius matching with a caliper of 0.001 (3) Kernel matching using Normal density function and (4) stratification matching
Bootstrapped clustered standard errors in parentheses
Coefficients are corrected by bootstrapping with 5000 replications
1000 VND ≈ 0.04 Euro
tion by itself seems to have no significant impact. In ad-
dition, lending procedures by subsidised credit are quite
complicated and based on a top-down approach. The
administrative planning of credit disbursement needs to
be approved by the local authority and the subsidised
bank. While rural households, especially the poor, need
credit in a timely fashion before the start of production
seasons, subsidised lending is also highly dependent on
the availability of subsidised fund.
4 Discussion
The limited access to credit is regarded as the main
source of poverty in the Northern Mountainous Region,
where most of the rural poor, ethnic minorities live and
draw their primary income from agriculture. The Viet-
namese government established a special bank to pro-
vide subsidised credit to poor households and recently
expanded credit disbursement as well. In order to de-
sign credit schemes for poor households in the region,
it is essential to examine the extent to which subsidised
credit reaches the poor and identify factors influencing
household access to this source of credit. It is also nec-
essary to know how subsidised credit affects household
income.
Results indicate that subsidised credit successfully
reached poor households as the majority of accessed
households belong to the three bottom groups, espe-
cially the poorest one. The separation of subsidised
credit from the banking system is helpful to the poor
in terms of improving their credit access. In this sense,
governmental subsidies are necessary.
The other finding from this analysis is the limited in-
come impact of credit on poor households. Although
subsidised credit has positive impacts on total household
income and total farm income, the magnitudes are small
and statistically insignificant. The findings in this analy-
sis are quite different from those by Cuong (2008), who
concluded that the subsidised credit program has a pos-
itive impact on poverty reduction at the national level.
However, his findings also noted that 67.1 % of recipi-
ents are non-poor. The result in this study is in line with
the finding of Hao (2005), who reported that the impact
of subsidised credit on poverty reduction was too small
given the high costs of providing credit to the poor. With
regard to the Northern Mountainous Region of Vietnam,
the small impact of subsidised credit indicates that a
wide range of complementary services including mar-
ket access, farming technologies, risk coping measures,
and infrastructure improvement are also necessary to the
poor. In fact, during the last two decades, despite over-
all impressive achievements of poverty reduction, the
Northern Mountainous Region in general and ethnic mi-
norities in particular experienced lower rates of poverty
reduction compared to the reduction rates country wide.
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The success of subsidised credit schemes is highly de-
pendent on the specific regional context. Although there
is evidence that the poor are well served by subsidised
credit, the conditions under which subsidised credit is
an effective tool in fighting poverty need further studies.
This paper used cross-sectional data, which could not
examine the income impact overtime.
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